Media in Situations of Conflict
Roles, Challenges and Responsibility

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Media in Situations of Conflict

Rights holders” at a conceptual level include are everybody with a right depending on the issue at hand.


Karimojong have to pay hundreds of head of cattle as bride price.

The President Yoweri Museveni’s Circular to All Political Leaders and Military Commanders in the Karamoja Region on Guidelines on Mobilisation for the Disarmament Exercise in Karamoja Region dated December 2001

1.

Nalugongo Achia, “Overview of the Karamoja Strategic Workshop” that took place on 17th – 19 May 2002 at Leslona and Mount Moroto Hotels.

As in Karamoja when MTN network was launched (2004) and there was excessive excitement among the elite there.

Even these programmes started barely two years ago (2000).

An interview in my office on 26th June 2003 at the UHRC.


6

Media, Peace-building, and the Culture of Violence

George W. Lugalambi

There is wide agreement today that far from being a crisis confined to the violence and mayhem instigated by the so-called Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), the conflict in northern Uganda has everything to do with the political economy of the region in general. The public and the media have been baffled by the persistence of this conflict, its destructiveness, and its apparent immunity from resolution. The government’s early insistence on a military rather than political solution seems to have been misguided as it poisoned the atmosphere for the subsequent attempts at a peaceful settlement. However wishy-washy the attempts at a negotiated settlement have been, the fact that this conflict has become so intractable is not an aberration. In this chapter, I will argue that the LRA conflict and indeed all types of conflict need to be understood fundamentally in three contexts: the first concerns the nature of conflict in society; the second concerns the political culture of violence; and the third is about violence as built into the structure of the political economy.

The Ugandan government has been facing off with insurgents of the LRA since 1988 in a conflict that now appears to meet the conditions of intractability. The LRA, a Christian fundamentalist group whose professed mission is to establish a government based on the biblical Ten Commandments, has visited ghastly violence upon the population of northern Uganda. Its crimes against humanity include abducting children and adults and forcing them into fighting, as well as killing, raping, maiming, and displacing countless numbers of people. The LRA is also listed on the US government’s Terrorism Exclusion List.

As Coleman (2000) points out, intractable conflicts persist for long without resolution, tending to escalate, transform, and flare up intermittently. They culminate in an interminably high degree of intensity
and devastation. Typically, intractable conflicts simmer in a complex web of issues rooted in historical, religious, cultural, political, and economic factors. Those who have experienced and observed the LRA will agree that intractable conflicts “give rise to a threat to basic human needs or values and result in destructive outcomes ranging from mutual alienation and contempt to mutual atrocities” (Coleman, 2000, p. 428) between those waging the conflict and those trapped in its path.

Nature of Conflict

In a functional society, the constructive management of conflict lies at the heart of the task of governance. If this premise is accepted, then the idea that conflict is an indispensable element of society, a central feature of social existence and progress (Nathan, 2000; Brand-Jacobsen, 2000; Nnoli, 1998) is not as heretical as it might sound. As far as Africa is concerned, what appears to confound many people is the nature of the conflicts raging on the continent. According to Tandon (2000), “even if there are ‘good’ reasons for conflicts, there are no ‘good’ reasons why these conflicts degenerate into violence and brutality that shame humanity” (p. 166). Nnoli (1998) understands conflict as the contradictions born of dissimilarities in “interests, ideas, ideologies, orientations, perceptions and tendencies” (p. 6). Since human affairs are basically about these kinds of differences, Nnoli (1998) concurs too that the real problem with conflict is its eruption into violence.

This perspective on conflict has implications for the way the media think about the causes of violence and how they engage with the process of peacebuilding. Therefore, the tendency to conceive of conflict solely in terms of violence leads to the erroneous assumption that where there is no direct and visible violence, there necessarily is no conflict (Brand-Jacobsen, 2000). As a result, the media, policy-makers, politicians, the international community, and the public are often easily drawn to the violent outcomes of a conflict. However, the eruption of violence typically signifies that a conflict has been poorly managed, for example, by ignoring it and by intervening half-heartedly or through misguided strategies. It is for this reason that following Galtung (1969), scholars have maintained the distinctions among different forms of violence: “direct,” “structural,” and “cultural” (Brand-Jacobsen, 2000; Opotow, 2000).

Differences in Violence

Direct or personal violence is tangible in that it appears in the form of physical acts like war, assault, sexual abuse, killing, and armed confrontation. Conversely, structural violence is latent in that it is embedded within the social, political, and economic systems of a society, community, country, and the world. Structural violence is embodied in the disparities in “the allocation of goods, resources, and opportunities, between different groups, classes, genders, nationalities, etc., because of the structure governing their relationship” (Brand-Jacobsen, 2000 p. 17).

The obscure nature of structural violence makes it difficult to decipher and to link to its direct manifestations, yet it contributes substantially to the intractability of conflicts. According to Galtung (1969), structural violence “shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances” (p. 171) owing to the skewed distribution of resources like education, health, and income. Apartheid, patriarchy, slavery, colonialism, imperialism, and globalisation have been cited as emblematic of structural violence. This type of violence is no less insidious or harmful than direct violence. In fact it is often more catastrophic if one considers the lives lost and human suffering resulting from investment in the production of armaments as opposed to goods and services that would save and improve lives (Brand-Jacobsen, 2000; Galtung, 1969).

Cultural violence refers to those elements of a culture that legitimise the use of violence as a way of dealing with conflict. Let us stay with Uganda’s political culture as an example. From colonial times through the postcolonial era, violence and coercion have been institutionalised as mechanisms to deal with conflict, thus undercutting the development and deepening of democratic values and supporting political norms (Mittelman, 1975; Makara & Tukahebwa, 1996; Ocitti, 2000). Much of the political violence in Uganda is attributable to the systematic denial of the people’s right to organise in pursuit of their collective interests. This partly has to do with the larger failure and difficulty to manage the competition for power. Yet the right to organise, in whichever form including as political parties, and for whatever purpose including opposing state policies or actions, is indispensable for citizens to be able to hold their government, politicians, and policy-makers democratically accountable (Mamdani, 1995).
Judging from the contested discourse about the role of political parties in Uganda, the tendency of those in power to conflate political opposition and legitimate dissent with subversion reflects a narrow, self-serving, and unsophisticated understanding of conflict. While there is strong ground to indict Uganda’s traditional political parties for their harmful contribution to the systemic crises the country has experienced, the evaluation of their performance, as Mamdani (1995) contends, has to be balanced with consideration of the underlying principles of pluralistic politics.

Managing Conflict

In a comparative assessment of the emergence of competitive party politics in Uganda and in the West, Apter (1961) concluded that for political parties in Western democracies, free and open conflict “is a source of strength in democracy” (p. 301). In this context, the function of conflict is to pinpoint grievances that need to be addressed. Looking at Uganda’s experience from a perspective of basic democratic principles, the problem with political parties is not that they are inherently unworkable as those currently in control of state power claim; nor is it that they are necessarily a panacea for the historical crisis of democracy as their proponents claim. Rather, the problem with political parties is symptomatic of a deeper failure of governance reflected in systemically dysfunctional approaches to conflict management. This failure of governance typifies a political culture in which violence and coercion have emerged as the norm.

Thus, what arguably is at issue is not so much the prevalence of conflict as the question of how to deal with it justly, democratically, and productively. Violent conflict, Nnoli (1998) tells us, grows out of the failure to accommodate and resolve differences using institutional arrangements and procedures that could eradicate or mitigate the negative consequences of these contradictions while making the most of their positive corollaries. Hence, “conflict resolution boils down to the creation of the conditions that will enable conflicting forces to accept these arrangements and procedures” (Nnoli, 1998, p. 6).

In states where the human, institutional, and material resources to settle disputes and grievances, to moderate competition, and to safeguard people’s rights and security are scarce or absent, individuals and groups may opt for direct violence (Nathan, 2000) to assert their claims. Successive Ugandan governments too have had the predilection to resort to direct violence to assert their authority and to exclude other individual and organised interests from the political process. When direct violence is used in response to contested issues or conflicts that are essentially political, then the scenario we are talking about is that of political violence, which Mittelman (1975) defines as “the utilisation of force to maintain or upset the prevailing mode of allocating values authoritatively” (p. 195).

Peace and Peacebuilding

Brand-Jacobsen (2000) contends that the way we understand violence is instrumental to the way we think about peace and peacebuilding. In this sense, the expectations we have of society in general are the same expectations we have of the media. For example, as a response to direct violence, the media can help society to identify and promote direct acts aimed at propping up peace and transforming conflicts. These include dialogue and conscientious pursuit of non-violence by exposing and opposing injustices, oppression, violent behaviour, and aggression at all levels of society and in all social domains (home, school, workplace, and so on).

In response to structural violence, the media can help society to identify the structures of peace necessary to cater for the people’s needs and opportunities for them to individually and collectively realise their full potential. This also includes those structures needed to ensure respect and protection of the rights of everybody or every group. In response to cultural violence, the media can help society to identify the cultures of peace whereby peace is cherished as a value. This goes along with honouring and celebrating differences as well as safeguarding the political, civil, social, economic, and cultural rights of all individuals, groups, and communities in society. Even if these responses to violence were based on the principles of conflict prevention (Ackermann, 2003, pp. 341-342), the logic of “structural prevention” of violence would require long-term strategies that integrate measures designed to establish democratic governance, ensure respect for human rights, allow civil society to grow, and foster economic, social, and political stability. This would be different from “operational prevention”, whose aim would be to tackle pending and unfolding crises as in the case of humanitarian intervention.

Collier and Hoeffler (2002) demonstrate in their economic model of civil war that violent conflict in sub-Saharan Africa is a contingent effect
of poor economic performance. However, one should not go away with the impression that direct violence is excusable in situations where the structural causes of violence such as economic deprivation admittedly remain intact to a large extent. For as Tandon (2000) argues, "growth or no growth, a culture of non-violence and respect for ethnic pluralism need to be cultivated and nourished in their own right" (p.167).

Thus far, the central points of this analysis have been that: (a) there is no essential linkage between conflict and violence. When conflict is properly managed, which is a function of governance, it can strengthen the democratic process by bringing contested issues out into the open so they can be projected onto the public agenda and addressed; (b) violence, and political violence in particular, has persisted in Uganda precisely because there is a culture that endorses or tolerates the use of violence to settle political questions and other differences; and (c) on top of interventions aimed at eroding the culture of violence, sustainable peacebuilding necessitates strategies aimed at progressively dismantling the structural elements of violence.

Media in Perspective

Having established a conceptual orientation that separates out forms of violence in terms of their specific characteristics and identifies the relationships among these forms, we can now locate the media within this conceptual matrix. From this point on, I will assign the media a cultural role in peacebuilding and in the management of conflict as well as in the prevention of violence. The attempt to focus media attention on the culture of violence comes from the observation that the conventions of the media draw journalists almost by instinct towards direct violence at the expense of peacebuilding and the cultural factors that make it possible for violent conflict to thrive.

The contribution of the media to promoting peace is a subject of debate. This is understandable given that journalists are not autonomous agents holding up a mirror for society to see reality or the truth. Rather, as Carruthers (2000) observes, news and the entire package of media output are shaped by journalists’ values as well as the ideological dispositions and institutional norms of the structures through which their work is organised. Becker (1982) has suggested that peace, to begin with, does not appeal to the media, a situation that was also reflected in the absence of empirical data about the media portrayal of peace. Jacobson and Jang (2002) have also proposed that the media may actually encourage war and violence because of the profit motive that drives newsgathering towards sensational stories that focus on superfluous and wanton violence. In the process, the news about violent conflict gets treated so simplistically that it leaves the public misinformed.

In some instances, the media have adopted what I consider to be counterproductive and illusionary neutral stances. Irrespective of the length to which journalists might go in trying to project their presumed neutrality, violent conflict by definition provokes and disturbs the values that undergird the sense we make of ourselves as a society. For that matter, when the media contrive to remain neutral in the face of violent conflict, they effectively undermine the moral imperative of their work. When neutrality is rationalised especially on the grounds that journalists must strike a balance in their reporting of a conflict, they may unwittingly create the impression of a “moral equivalence” (Carruthers, 2000, p. 241) between the parties involved.

Understanding Media

Just as the impact of the media on public policy in general remains a moot question, so is their effect on peacebuilding. The disputed notion of the “CNN effect” is often used to test the media-policy relationship particularly in foreign affairs (Livingstone, 2000). This notion is relevant to intrastate peace processes as well because foreign policy in many instances revolves around issues of peacebuilding and conflict such as negotiation of peace settlements, intervention in humanitarian crises, and containment of violence within states. In Robinson’s (2000) “policy-media interaction model”, the CNN effect is about the conditions under which media coverage may succeed or fail to influence the foreign policies of major Western powers. I am, however, adapting and extending elements of this idea to apply beyond the realm of Western foreign policy towards conflict management.

As an example, the media in a country like Uganda may so “frame” their coverage of a conflict as to empathise with those who bear the brunt of violence and its effects by portraying them as victims. In this kind of framing, the government may be implicitly or explicitly criticized for not aggressively initiating and following through with a peaceful resolution.
to a conflict. On the other hand, journalists may report on a conflict by keeping emotionally aloof from it. The framing effect of this kind of detachment may be to implicitly endorse the position of one side or the other; and usually the dominant party, which tends to be the government, has the greater muscle to shape its position and to ensure that this position is represented. These media practices have implications for peacebuilding in Uganda because governments and their adversaries in violent conflict are more often than not inclined to respond militarily and violently rather than peacefully and democratically.

While the concept of the CNN effect assumes that the media force governments to act against their will or in ways they ordinarily would not, I employ the idea broadly to underline the perceived power of the media to influence the decisions of different political actors in a conflict. However, although it is intuitive to think of the media as having a powerful influence on the decisions that determine the course of a conflict, Jakobsen (2000) argues that thinking about media influence in terms of direct cause-and-effect blurs the indirect and indiscernible but bigger effect of the media coverage of conflict. The real impact of the media is disguised in their editorial and news production values. For example, the media often ignore conflicts before they break out into violence and after the hostilities have ended. Moreover, even when they are covering the violent phase of a conflict, the media tend to be decidedly selective. One of the consequences of these media approaches to covering conflict is to turn the attention away from long-term measures aimed at preventing conflicts from becoming violent to short-term interventions (Jakobsen, 2000). This reinforces the public and media’s own tendency to focus on direct violence at the expense of the cultural and structural dimensions of violence.

**Sensitivity to Media**

Clearly, the history of violent conflict in Uganda suggests that governments are invariably sensitive to the influence that the media have on public perceptions of their effectiveness or competence in resolving conflicts and on public attributions of responsibility for their causes and solutions. This is why the current Ugandan government, like those that preceded it, demands and expects the compliance of the media, especially when it is under pressure. This has usually been the case whenever things have tended to boil over during confrontations with armed groups. In Africa, media freedom is at its most precarious when governments are politically distressed (Lugalambi, 2003), which happens particularly when governments are faced with armed political challenges. This has implications for the quality of information that the public gets during situations of violent conflict. Yet, if ever there was a need for robust, independent journalism, situations of armed conflict present the strongest case for such journalism. The reason is that in underdeveloped democracies, there is not the kind of civilian control and public scrutiny of the military as there is in the advanced democracies. In the absence of democratic scrutiny, the military has often been injudicious in handling conflicts.

Ugandans by and large concur that the LRA’s behaviour is out of sync with the grievances it is claiming. But the military too has sometimes been censured for its high-handed and indiscriminate response to the conflict. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks in the US, the designation of the LRA as a terrorist group provided the government with new justifications in its fight against the rebels and those it imagines as being sympathetic to their cause. Freedom House said in its *Annual Survey of Press Freedom 2002* that terrorism had given some governments a rationale to deal harshly with the media.³

The Ugandan government has routinely suppressed the media. However, judging by its own rhetoric about its record on free speech, many people probably did not expect the government to stop the publication of a newspaper altogether at this point in the democratisation process. On October 10, 2002, the country’s main independent daily, *The Monitor*, published a story claiming that an army combat helicopter had crashed under unclear circumstances while fighting the LRA. Beyond the specifics of the story, the wider and touchy implication was that the chopper had been shot down during operations that the government was keen to portray to the public as its toughest and ultimate offensive against this protracted insurgency.

The military vehemently denied the story. The ensuing police raid of the newsrooms, offices, and production facilities of *The Monitor* in search of the source of the story shut it down for a week. This prompted speculation and concerns that the government intended to ban the paper. A military spokesman, Lt Paddy Ankunda, referred to the story as “a kind of psychological terrorism” for which the newspaper would have to answer.⁴ The foreign affairs minister, James Wapakhabulo, responded to
the US government Concerns about the fate of independent media in Uganda following action against The Monitor by echoing the US’s own national security advisor Condoleezza Rice. In October 2001, Rice exhorted the US media not to broadcast or publish Osama bin Laden’s speeches without screening them for inflammatory material or coded messages. As Wapakhabulo put it:

Uganda shares the position of the US that the Fight against terrorism requires firm and deliberate action and it was on the basis of this belief that the US government advised media houses to desist from publishing and reproducing propaganda emanating from the Qatar-based Al Jazeera television station which was being used by Al Qaeda terrorists.5

In mid 2003, when the LRA extended their attacks to eastern Uganda, the government closed a local station, Radio Kyoga Veritas FM, “accusing it of broadcasting alarmist news about the attacks of the Lord’s Resistance Army rebels in Teso sub-region.”6

The merits and demerits of these media reports and the reactions they touched off in the government, the military, and the public need not concern us too much at this moment. The relevance of these two examples is in the light they shed on the observation by Bruck and Roach (1993) that the media provide the information environment in which we derive our perceptions of the world around us. Therefore, the nature of coverage that media audiences encounter has a critical impact on people’s political effectiveness and their perception of how important peace issues are to the political agenda and the life of a society in general.

**Media Marginalises Peace**

The problem though, as suggested earlier, remains that matters of peace are barely covered in the media. The reasons have been traced back to the very organisation and structure of the media system and its influence on the production of media content. Even when journalists individually and by their own initiative or enterprise are willing to challenge the conventions of their trade, they find that they have to pit their conscience against the corporate culture in which they work. As Tehranian (2002) contends, “most journalists tend to be moral agents caught in immoral predicaments” (p. 75). Besides, the news production codes of the media privilege the dramatic and the sensational over issues that evolve gradually or through a process.

Since peace is a process rather than a fixed condition (Bruck and Roach, 1993), the media cannot meaningfully capture the process of peacebuilding episodically, that is, by spotlighting developments as bounded events or series of occurrences with a definite beginning and end. The view that the majority of Ugandans get their news from radio has been held for a long time. But while our understanding of the impact of radio on political cognition remained largely intuitive, evidence has emerged in recent years suggesting that the principal media in Africa – radio, television, and newspapers, in that order – interact variously with interpersonal contacts to influence public opinion (Afrobarometer, 2003). Because of this assumed interaction among different media forms, on the one hand, and between mass media and interpersonal contacts, on the other, what we know about a particular medium can give us useful clues regarding public opinion on collective political preferences.

For example, we can extrapolate from Iyengar’s (1991) study of television news in the US in which he examined the effect of “episodic” and “thematic” news formats, known as “frames”, on how viewers attribute responsibility for political issues and how these news frames indirectly affect public opinion. To frame news episodically is to concentrate on particular events or cases, whereas to frame news thematically is to present issues and events within a broad context. The problem with the tendency towards episodic framing is that issues like peacebuilding that do not lend themselves to packaging as specific happenings are hardly a priority for coverage; and that is if, for starters, they get considered at all. The media’s emphasis on episodic framing of news particularly affects the way news is selected for television and how the public assigns responsibility for given political issues. According to Iyengar (1991, pp. 2-3):

Exposure to episodic news makes viewers less likely to hold public officials accountable for the existence of some problem and also less likely to hold them responsible for alleviating it. By discouraging viewers from attributing responsibility for national issues to political actors, television decreases the public’s control over their elected representatives and the policies they pursue.

The attribution of responsibility is considered essential for citizens to exercise civic control over those in power, and the way issues are framed in television news significantly impacts such attributions (Iyengar, 1991). There are compelling reasons to infer that these patterns observed in the
packaging of television news apply to a substantial degree to the media in general. This is because there are common patterns behind news production values across all media forms and systems, and many studies have examined and confirmed these patterns (Gans, 1979; Gitlin, 1980).

**Traditional Journalism**

Media scholars have found that the media's traditional approaches to news are particularly at odds with the process of peacebuilding. Wolfsfeld (1997) studied the role of the Israeli news media in the Middle East conflict and concluded that the relationship between the goals of the peace process and the journalists' professional routines were so contradictory that the media were in fact formidable impediments to peace efforts in Israel. He describes a news environment characterised by a virtually irreconcilable polarisation separating the values of peace from the values of the media.

For instance, Wolfsfeld (1997) contends that whereas peacebuilding is complex, journalists want events and issues that are straightforward; whereas peacebuilding may evolve gradually and uneventfully, journalists yearn for activity and instant outcomes; whereas negotiations for peace generally proceed in a dreary process, journalists are obsessed with drama. Furthermore, while success in peacebuilding results in a thaw of tensions, conflict remains the staple of journalism; and while it is inevitable that the critical aspects of a peace process will happen out of the public and media's sight, for journalists what matters are information and access.

Nonetheless, Wolfsfeld (1997) still believes that despite their negative impact, the media are just as capable of making a positive contribution to the peace process. In any case, the media can either glorify or puncture the images of the parties to a conflict, infuse optimistic or pessimistic impressions about the possibilities of peace, fortify or undermine the public's willingness to compromise, and buttress or render hollow the legitimacy of the protagonists in a conflict including the state.

**Media's Social Mandate**

While questions linger over the issue of whether the media can promote peace, we can only begin to settle these questions by linking peacebuilding to the media's social mandate; or the idea of journalism implemented with a social purpose. In a previous exploration of how the media can help prevent conflict, I floated five generic roles for the media (Lugalambi, 2001). I consider these roles to be as germane to peacebuilding as they are to conflict prevention, and I will briefly interpret and summarise them here.

The first role, that is, nurturing the public interest, compels the media to champion a common vision based on those core principles and values around which citizens ought to be encouraged to unite. The second role, namely, cultivating public consensus, is about the media helping to focus citizens' attention on issues of collective concern, to generate agreement, and to persuade people to voice their opinions. The third role, that is, feeling the pulse of public opinion, requires that the media constantly provide a kind of social intelligence that captures the essence of citizens' perceptions of issues at stake, thus identifying points of tension before they crack. The fourth role, namely, directing the current of public opinion, makes it incumbent upon the media to articulate the concerns of those who may disagree with the dominant thinking but whose claims are nevertheless as legitimate as those held by the majority. And the fifth role, which is that of critical engagement with issues, compels the media to rigorously inquire into the motives of all the parties to a conflict with an eye to establishing and challenging those tendencies that might ruin peacebuilding efforts.

Underlying the journalistic strategies implicit in the five roles specified above is the idea that the media can support peacebuilding by proactively working against those elements of the political culture that enable the institutionalisation of violence. This approach to reporting puts greater weight on the social mechanisms and democratic values that are needed to entrench the culture of peace as an essential part of the political culture. Meaningful democracy presupposes the existence of a political culture in which peacebuilding is a central feature of the process of democratisation.

Conflict activists, practitioners, and analysts have developed and proposed an array of important functions or roles that the media in Africa may take on in helping to prevent, resolve, and manage conflicts (Onadipe and Lord, 1998; Manoff, 1998; Hieber, 1998). The essence of my argument, however, is that the media can best promote peacebuilding by focusing their attention on those aspects of the political culture that create the environment for violence in the first place. I submit that it is the culture of violence that creates the conditions for the undemocratic and violently authoritarian responses to political conflict both by those in power and those opposed to them.
Peace is not a tangible condition that should be reduced to or equated with the absence of direct violence. Rather, it is a way of life and a social attitude that affects collective democratic behaviour. We should be able to talk about evolving a culture of peace the way we talk about dismantling the culture of violence. Uganda as a society must find ways of nurturing a culture of peace by creating democratic institutions and systems of governance for arbitrating conflicts. With these structures and their accompanying norms in place, people will have less reason to resort to violence when dealing with political conflicts. The media can contribute to the development of norms of peace within Uganda’s political culture.

Conclusion

This chapter has elaborated the characteristics of conflict and violence, making the point that although conflicts are endemic to human interaction, they do not have to be violent. For that matter, Uganda as a society has to work hard through its social institutions like the media at fostering the culture of peace within the broader political culture. Various reasons have been advanced to explain why it is easier and more practical for the media to focus on violent conflict than to communicate about peace and peacebuilding. These problems notwithstanding, the Ugandan media are duty-bound to promote a political culture that shuns violence in favour of peaceful and democratic solutions to legitimate differences.

Notes
1 See for example the related issues raised in a seminar by Conciliation Resources (London), the Centre of African Studies (University of London), and Kacoke Madit (London) at http://www.c-r.org/pubs/occ_papers/Learning_Uganda.shtml Retrieved July 17, 2003.


